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It is initially odd to ask whether Confucianism is compatible 
with systems of law.  Confucian thought has co-existed with 
Chinese legal systems throughout the various dynasties of 
China’s long history.  Nevertheless, despite the extensive laws 
that China has boasted, traditional Chinese legal thought is not 
typically recognized as a genuine rule-of-law system, given its 
focus on moral development and the “rule of man.”  In this essay, 
we argue that Confucianism, specifically Pre-Qin Confucianism, 
is compatible with the rule-of-law.  We examine the different 
models of compatibility, including “soft compatibilism” in which 
we examine whether abstract concepts between Confucianism 
and legal systems are compatible, as well as co-existing and 
integrating compatibilism.  Co-existing compatibilism sees 
Confucianism and the law occupying different spheres within the 
same legal system while integrating compatibilism sees 
Confucianism and the law coming together into a new system.  In 
this way, Confucianism offers China an alternative to liberal 
democratic and Marxist theories of law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To the Twentieth Century Chinese lawyer and legal 
philosopher John C. H. Wu, Chinese legal thought was 
dominated by a “backward and stagnant” conception of law 
caused by a devotion to the limited moral philosophy of 
Confucianism.3  Law, for Dr. Wu, at least at that time, could not 
sprout from morality.  Therefore, the Confucian model for the 
law was inferior to the Legalist school of Shang Yang and Han 
Fei, which advocated clear laws and strict punishments.  
Following his friend, the Supreme Court Justice and champion 
of Twentieth Century American legal realism Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., Dr. Wu argued that the law could not be limited in 
its concern for the virtuous few, but must be designed to take 
into account the unvirtuous many.4  With the introduction of 
Western influences at the end of the Nineteenth Century, the 
Chinese legal tradition began to move away from the Confucian 
“strait-jacket” which had left China with a stagnant and 
moralistic view of the law.5  Confucianism, for all of its qualities, 
was not helpful in Dr. Wu’s early project of “Holmesianiz[ing] 
the Law of China!”6 
Dr. Wu maintained a prevalent role in the development of 
the law in the Republic of China, the political entity in which he 
lived.  He received degrees in the United States and Europe, 
published articles in American and Chinese law reviews, held 
teaching positions at the Comparative Law School of China in 
Shanghai and Northwestern University in Chicago, and served 
as a judge for the Provisional Court of Shanghai.7  He also 
maintained extensive correspondences with some of the legal 
luminaries of his time, including Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe 
Pound, and Justice Holmes.8  Dr. Wu went on to be the principal 
 
3. Note, Dr. Wu’s Constitution, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2300, 2318 (2019). 
4. See John C. H. Wu, The Struggle Between Government of Laws and 
Government of Men in the History of China, 5 CHINA L. REV. 53, 62 (1932). 
5. Id. at 68. 
6. JOHN C. H. WU, BEYOND EAST & WEST 206 (2018).  Professor Teemu 
Ruskola, however, notes that reception of Chinese law in the West was not 
wholly negative.  See TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND MODERN LAW (2013).  He notes, for example, that American 
statesman Benjamin Franklin admired the Qing legal code.  Id. at 44. 
7. Dr. Wu’s Constitution, supra note 3, at 2300. 
8. Id. at 2300–11. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/5
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author of the first draft of the Permanent Constitution of the 
Republic of China, a constitution that was eventually ratified in 
1946 and continues in some form in Taiwan.9  His many roles in 
China serves as an example of the Chinese legal mind of that 
period: a Western-educated individual that sought to modernize 
China by making the country more Western.  Democracy, 
fundamental rights, and the rule-of-law were the key principles 
of the era, with only a minimized, or even privatized, place for 
Confucius. 
Later in life, Dr. Wu would express gratitude to the ancient 
Chinese philosophies of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, 
describing himself as being born in their “milieu.”10  His 
thankfulness for these native traditions of China came from 
their role as his pedagogues for his eventual conversion to 
Catholicism, and though he never shakes his condescension for 
some of the more superstitious aspects of these traditions, he 
acknowledges how he was shaped by them.11  For all of his 
attempts to modernize his country through the Western legal 
theory which he had spent his life studying, Dr. Wu could never 
truly rid his country, and himself, of the Confucianism that 
permeated his world. 
Nor has China ever been able to shake its “indigenous 
resources” in its recent project of renewing Chinese law.12  Many 
contemporary thinkers have drawn from Confucianism, as well 
as other traditional Chinese philosophies, in constructing 
alternative ways to address China’s current controversies.  This 
includes the New Confucianism (新儒家), a contemporary 
movement represented by Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, and Tang 
Junyi.13  Outside of the New Confucians, there have been many 
contemporary philosophers who have included interpretations of 
Confucianism in relation to Western philosophical traditions.  
The contemporary engagement of Confucianism is influential 
among philosophy departments in China and abroad.14  
 
9. Id. at 2307. 
10. WU, supra note 6, at 44. 
11. Id. 
12. RUSKOLA, supra note 6, at 227. 
13. See NEW CONFUCIANISM: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 1–42 (John 
Makeham, ed., 2003). 
14. See TONGDONG BAI, AGAINST POLITICAL EQUALITY: THE CONFUCIAN 
CASE (2020); DANIEL A. BELL, THE CHINA MODEL: POLITICAL MERITOCRACY AND 
THE LIMITS OF DEMOCRACY (2015); Baogang He, Four Models of the Relationship 
3
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Nevertheless, Western notions of the rule-of-law and democratic 
theory still remain influential, and even the most 
unconventional contemporary Confucian thinkers still conceive 
of a political system with elements of democratic forms of 
government.15  Even with a revival of Confucian thought in 
China, the Western political theory remains influential and 
cannot be ignored. 
It is difficult to define “Confucianism.” Covering various 
themes, Confucianism is expansive as a school of thought, 
having undergone various transformations throughout Chinese 
history.  In this essay, we focus specifically on pre-Qin 
Confucianism, specifically drawing from the Analects.  Further, 
as Confucius did not have a general philosophy of jurisprudence, 
we will draw from political interpretations of Confucius’s moral 
philosophy.  It is from this interpretation of Confucianism that 
we think is compatible with systems of law. 
At first glance, it is odd to ask whether Confucianism is 
compatible with law.  Confucianism has long co-existed with 
Chinese legal systems throughout various dynasties.  Eric Li, for 
example, argues that China historically incorporated both 
Confucianism and Legalism to develop its government.16  While 
Confucianism emerged over Legalism as the preeminent 
philosophy of China, co-existing happily with Buddhism and 
Daoism, Li acknowledged that Legalism continued to remain an 
“integral” part of the Chinese government.17  Nevertheless, as 
discussed above, Chinese law is not recognized as a genuine rule-
of-law system, given its focus on moral development and the 
“rule of man.”  In this essay, however, we argue that 
Confucianism is compatible with the rule-of-law.18 
 
Between Confucianism and Democracy, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT: DEBATES AND PERSPECTIVES 131 (Fred Dallmayr &  Zhao Tingyang 
eds., 2012); QING JIANG, A CONFUCIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HOW CHINA’S 
ANCIENT PAST CAN SHAPE ITS POLITICAL FUTURE (Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan 
eds., Edmund Ryden trans., 2013); YONG XIA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINA (2011). 
15. The unconventional Confucian thinker Jiang Qing, for example, has 
argued for a form of government in which Confucianism permeates society at 
the foundational level.  See generally JIANG, supra note 14.  Though 
unconventional, however, Jiang’s model still envisions a trifurcated legislature 
with each house possessing checks-and-balances over the others.  Id. 
16. Eric Li, China and the Rule of Law, 3 AM. AFFS. J. 133 (2019). 
17. Id. 
18. Our methodology in this paper will follow the methodology we used in 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/5
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One attempt to address the question of compatibility is 
Professor He Baogang’s identification of four models describing 
the relationship between Confucianism and democracy.  In his 
essay, Professor He identifies the models of the relationship as 
conflict, compatible, hybrid, and critical.19  However, even within 
his compatibility model, we can identify four additional models 
to describe the different ways the systems can be compatible: 
soft compatibilism, hard compatibilism, co-existing 
compatibilism, and integrating compatibilism.20 
Soft compatibilism and hard compatibilism examine what is 
compatible between Confucianism and democracy, such as the 
elements, aspects, or institutions being compared between 
traditions.  Co-existing compatibilism and integrating 
compatibilism, on the other hand, distinguish how Confucianism 
and democracy can be compatible.  The primary concern of these 
models is what a government that combines the two traditions 
might look like and how the traditions’ different elements might 
work together. 21 
II. SOFT COMPATIBILISM: FA, LI, AND LAW 
We will begin by looking at the “what” question.  “What” are 
we comparing when we say that Confucianism is compatible 
with the rule of law?  Asking the “what” question gives us two 
models: hard compatibilism and soft compatibilism.  Hard 
compatibilism looks at the different legal institutions between 
Confucian and democratic systems.22  However, identifying 
institutions between the traditions is demanding as the 
development of institutions is often tied with their historical 
background.23  Instead, we will begin by examining the abstract 
 
our examination of the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy.  
Specifically, we examine compatibility through the four models of 
compatibilism we established in the previous analysis (i.e., soft, hard, co-
existing, integrating).  See Sophia Gao & Aaron Walayat, Confucianism and 
Democracy: Four Models of Compatibilism, J. CHINESE HUMANITIES 
(forthcoming 2021).  While that analysis focused on the compatibility of 
Confucianism and democracy generally, this examination is primarily 
concerned with Confucianism and the rule of law. 
19. He, supra note 14. 
20. Gao & Walayat, supra note 18. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. 
5
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ideas or values upon which these legal institutions are based or 
attempt to manifest. 
The comparison of abstract concepts is what we call soft 
compatibilism.  Professor He, discussing this comparison, 
compares it to “color matching” referring to the comparison of 
concepts within one system with its counterparts in another.24  
In this section, we will compare the abstract conceptions of the 
law (li and fa) between Confucian and Western democratic 
systems. 
We now have the difficult task of asking what is meant by 
the word “law.”  Latin has two words that can be translated to 
mean law—jus, denoting the abstract nature of the law, and lex, 
referring to enacted laws.25  More modernly, the Austinian 
definition of law describes the law as the command of a sovereign 
which an inferior must obey under threat of punishment.26  
Alternatively, sociologist Eugen Ehrlich refers to a “living law,” 
composed of norms resultant from influences outside of legal and 
political systems, including family, religious, and other social 
influences.27  Luke T. Lee and Whalen W. Lai argue that there 
are two conceptions of the law in Chinese philosophy mirroring 
the Austin-Ehrlich definitions of law: fa (法) and li (禮).28 
Fa is the definition of the law associated with the Legalist 
school of thought.  The Legalists “rel[ied] on the force of 
sanctions to obtain obedience to and compliance with the law, 
and therefore . . . stress[ed] government by fa or decree, as 
opposed to the Confucian emphasis on government by man and 
li.”29  Thus, while fa is defined as “law,” its scope is narrow, 
focusing mainly on decree and punishment.  Li is more difficult 
to translate, but it has been described as “propriety, ethics, or 
 
24. He, supra note 14, at 138. 
25. See Caleb Wan, Note, Confucianism and Higher Law Thinking in 
Ancient China, 10 REGENT J. INT’L L. 77, 78 (2013) (citing Liang Zhiping, 
Explicating “Law”: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal 
Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55, 56 (1989)). 
26. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 
(1832). 
27. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
493 (2009). 
28. Luke T. Lee & Whalen W. Lai, The Chinese Conceptions of Law: 
Confucian, Legalist, and Buddhist, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1308 (1978). 
29. Id. at 1309. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/5
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moral rules of correct conduct and good manners.”30  In the 
narrowest sense, li refers to religious rituals.  However, in a 
broader sense, it can also denote a “variety of duties and polite 
behaviors in all customary situations involving social 
relationships.”31 
Confucius was pessimistic with the use of the law and 
punishments (xing) alone.32  Analects 2:3 expresses this view: 
 
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought 
to be given them by punishments, they will try to 
avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame.  
If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to 
be given them by the rules of propriety, they will 
have the sense of shame, and moreover will 
become good.33 
 
Confucius’s pessimism about the law in the form of 
punishments is that it would not build a sense of shame, as the 
people would merely seek to avoid punishments.  It is not enough 
for Confucius to avoid punishments, as his philosophical goals 
were not simply to create a society that avoided legal 
punishments, but to cultivate individuals to actively seek good.  
Instead, people ought to be led by virtue and li, in which they 
would have a healthy sense of shame that would lead to the self-
correction of their wrongness into a good moral character.  Thus, 
the goal is not just to prevent misconduct, but to develop proper 
moral emotions, like a sense of shame to moral shortcomings 
which would motivate moral development. 
While Confucianism places less emphasis on the law as 
punishment (fa and xing), the more abstract notion of li plays an 
important role in Confucian thought.  Li is often translated as 
“rituals,” “propriety,” “politeness,” or “etiquette.”  For Confucius, 
 
30. Id. at 1308. 
31. Wan, supra note 25, at 85; see also Herbert H. P. Ma, The Legalization 
of Confucianism and Its Impact on Family Relationships, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 
670, n.13 (1987) (describing how li originally referred only to “religious 
sacrifice” but has also come to include “ceremony, ritual, decorum, rules of 
propriety, good customs, etc.”). 
32. See, e.g., 1 CONFUCIUS, THE CHINESE CLASSICS: THE LIFE AND 
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li was a revival of rituals purportedly practiced in the Zhou 
dynasty.  These rituals were deeply focused on religious aspects 
such as ancestor veneration, but also applied to other situations.  
Confucius also believed that li would be helpful in moral 
education.  One of the main functions of li is to regulate people’s 
actions and attitudes in order for them to better perform their 
social roles.  Li’s function can also be instrumental, serving as a 
means to cultivate virtues through ritual practice.34  Confucius 
emphasized that the mechanical practice of li would not be 
enough, and participants needed to develop proper emotions 
toward the practice of li.35  Li could also help in reforming 
peoples’ moral emotions and virtues.36 
Rituals, generally, include a wide range of content which 
include the ceremonies of birth, death, marriage, initiation, 
healing, harvest, and religious observance.  Li also includes how 
one dresses, walks, and sits.  Like rituals, li touches on people’s 
“core emotions” and reveals a society’s values.37  The law can also 
serve this function, joining individuals in solidarity within their 
group and imposing certain conventions and obligatory 
behaviors.  Both law and ritual become part of the “essential 
constitution of human societies,” developing “a set of shared 
understandings about how political power is to be allocated 
among, and exercised by, the remembers of a given social 
organization.”38  Similarly, li can be compared to Western 
conceptions of the law, albeit in an abstract sense.  While 
Western law is still possessed by legal positivism, which 
conceptualizes the law as commands or as rules, there have also 
been contemporary legal theorists like John Noonan and Walter 
Otto Weyrauch who recognize the important role of legal 
 
34. See Kwong-loi Shun, Jen and Li in the Analects, 43 PHIL. E. & W. 457, 
457–79 (1993) (providing more information on the “instrumental” function of 
li). 
35. See, e.g., CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. XVII.  Confucius notes that 
ritual is more than “gems and silk,” referring to the importance of ritual beyond 
mere ornamentation.  Id.  The importance of li is not in simply keeping the 
rules, but in developing the moral emotions through the practice of rituals.  
This can be compared to the use of “burnt offerings” in the Old Testament 
where God sometimes notes the meaninglessness of offerings made 
mechanically.  See Psalm 50:8 (King James); Isaiah 1:11 (King James). 
36. See CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. VIII. 
37. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1181, 1181 (2005). 
38. Id. at 1181. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/5
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rituals.39 
The late Judge John Noonan, Jr. discussed legal masks and 
legal rituals in his book, Persons and Masks of the Law.40  
“Masks” refer to legal constructs that hide an individual’s 
humanity within the legal process.41  The clearest example is the 
masking of people as property in the case of slavery.42  Noonan 
condemned the use of masks as problematic, as they breed 
injustice by allowing courts to render judgments with little 
concern for the humanity of the parties.43  Writing in response, 
Walter Otto Weyrauch recognized these problematic uses, but 
also noted the value of legal masks as well as their 
inevitability.44  The uses of “masks” are inevitable, as the notion 
of “law as mask” is used to “invoke a higher authority in a 
dramatic ceremony” by “channel[ing] emotions and events into 
fixed styles of reasoning that are, regardless of their intrinsic 
truth, aesthetically appealing and persuasive to the participants 
and the community.”45  Legal rituals, therefore, have an 
aesthetic role in being persuasive in people’s lives and in 
constructing the appearance of authority.  Some of the practical 
aspects of masks, Weyrauch notes, include aiding in the exercise 
of control, being “tools for the enforcement of social policies,” and 
supporting the legal system’s “peace-keeper” function.46  The 
uses of legal masks described by Weyrauch, however, only note 
the helpfulness of these masks in “control,” “enforcement,” and 
“peace-keeping.”47  “Legal masks” are a part of legal rituals 
where the ceremonial masks and the law play a similar social 
function.48  These uses are limited, then, by the fact that the 
masks are useful in restraining the participants of the legal 
system. 
Confucius would acknowledge these uses of masks and legal 
 
39. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 
(1976); Walter Otto Weyrauch, Law as Mask—Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 
CALIF. L. REV. 699 (1978). 
40. NOONAN, supra note 39. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 14–19. 
43. Id. 
44. Weyrauch, supra note 39, at 721–25. 
45. Id. at 725–26. 
46. Id. at 714. 
47. Id. at 714–18. 
48. Id. at 717. 
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rituals.  Li regulates conduct by providing rules meant to guide 
people to making right actions in the proper situations.49  As he 
states in the Analects 15.18: “The superior man in everything 
considers righteousness to be essential.  He performs it 
according to the rules of propriety.  He brings it forth in 
humility.  He completes it with sincerity.  This is indeed a 
superior man.”50  However, Confucius would go a step farther 
than Weyrauch, not only examining the usefulness of masks in 
restraining people toward proper actions, but as offering a 
pedagogical characteristic to li.51  John Finnis identifies 
“aesthetic experience” as one of his basic human goods.52  He 
writes: “the aesthetic attitude is constituted by a unique balance 
of intellect and feeling in the contemplation and grasp of a 
symbol that expresses the idea of emotion or feeling.”53  As 
Bullough notes, contemplating art requires a “psychical 
distance” between the work at the audience, a distance that 
comes from “separating the object and its appeal from one’s self, 
 
49. Wan notes that li, in the “broadest sense” include the “rules of 
propriety and proper conduct for all institutions and relationships.”  Wan, 
supra note 25, at 85–86.  Li in this sense provides requirements, even rules, 
for proper conduct in private relationships, most reflected in Confucius’s 
concern for filial piety, or the duties that people owe to their familial relations, 
specifically their parents.  Confucians also emphasized “governing by li” and 
“teaching by example.”  Id.  This indicates that Confucius saw li as also guiding 
public conduct and in an ideal Confucian order, a good ruler must “provide the 
people with an example of proper behavior according to li.”  Id. 
50. CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. XV. 
51. There are different interpretations of Confucius regarding the 
relationship of li with traditional rules.  Joel Kupperman, for example, 
acknowledges that Confucius’s li was “very closely related to rules and 
traditions.”  JOEL J. KUPPERMAN, LEARNING FROM ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 33–34 
(1999).  Nevertheless, Kupperman writes that other commentators, like H.G. 
Creel, argue that Confucian li was not only grounded on traditional practice, 
but also involves “the ability to modify them as circumstances and common 
sense might require.”  Id. (citing H.G. CREEL, CONFUCIUS, THE MAN AND THE 
MYTH 85 (1949)).  Kupperman cites the Analects’s “general avoidance of pat [sic] 
solutions and in his willingness to adjust to a student’s personality what he 
says to the student.”  Id.  With a moral philosophy that was not based on bright-
lines rules, Kupperman notes that Confucius instead emphasized moral 
education, internalizing the relationships embodied in li not as simple, bright-
line rules, but as rules that develop personal character into someone who is 
able to come to right moral decisions in particular situation.  Thus, moral 
education is central.  See id. 
52. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 87 (Paul Craig ed., 
2d ed. 2011). 
53. John M. Finnis, Reason and Passion: The Constitutional Dialectic of 
Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 236 (1967). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/5
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by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends.”54  The 
contemplation of art also contributes to developing our ability to 
talk about beauty.  As Iris Murdoch wrote, “[w]e develop 
language in the context of looking.”55 
Understanding li as a form of art or drama, the value of the 
ritual practice comes from what is learned from contemplating 
rituals at a “psychical distance.”  As Bullough notes, 
contemplation of art at this distance comes from separating the 
rituals from our practical needs and ends, allowing observers to 
contemplate the rituals as things-in-themselves.56  In observing 
li from a psychical distance, that is, observing li outside of the 
practical aspect of ritual behaviors, observers are able to 
contemplate the moral and emotional development 
communicated through ritual. While this type of contemplation 
may initially seem like a practical benefit, note that this moral 
and emotional development is not said to occur because of the 
rituals themselves but from the communicated meaning 
contemplated from the rituals.  Contemplating rituals as works 
of art provides an aesthetic experience that both develops moral 
emotions as well as developing the “language” by which we 
understand the rituals themselves.57 
What would it mean to look at the law as a ritual from a 
“psychical distance?”  The legal positivist and legal realist 
interpretations of the law would likely be unable to see the law 
from this distance, as it would be unable to contemplate the law 
separated from its practical needs and ends.  However, observing 
the law from a psychical distance allows observers to 
contemplate the law, or the meaning within legal rituals, 
separated from the immediate needs and ends of the law as 
applied in the present case.  Observing the law from a distance 
 
54. EDWARD BULLOUGH, AESTHETICS 96 (Elizabeth M. Wilkinson ed., 
1957). 
55. IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 33 (1971). 
56. See BULLOUGH, supra note 54, at 93–130. 
57. Drawing from Iris Murdoch’s observation that we develop “language 
in the context of looking,” observing ritual from a “psychical distance” creates 
an understanding of the rituals as ends-in-themselves.  MURDOCH, supra note 
55, at 3.  The value of the ritual is not the conservative benefits of social 
cohesion through cultural practice, but as moral communication of the person’s 
relation to himself, others, and the world as described in the way rituals frame 
that person’s relations to others.  In this way, persons develop a “language” or 
an understanding of their relations to others through observations of the 
communications within rituals. 
11
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allows observers to contemplate the narratives within the law.  
John Noonan, as discussed above, provides an important 
contemplation of the law in this way, noting the masks of the 
law.58  While the judges described by Noonan applied the masks 
of the law in an immediate way, Noonan observes the uses of 
masks to hide an individual’s humanity.59  He observes how 
these fictions change how people are viewed within legal cases.60  
This is because peoples’ humanity is “masked” by the law.61  The 
law, therefore, assists in “developing a language in the context 
of looking.”62  By contemplating the law, we can see how the law 
values certain behaviors generally.  It is through this 
contemplation that we develop our language of understanding 
what we are observing.  This language notes the difference 
between “relevant” and “admissible” evidence and the existence 
of mens rea in committing a murder.  The law, like li, has ritual 
significance in people’s lives, developing a “language in the 
context of looking” that may be internalized by the participants 
in the legal process.63 
In Confucianism, it is difficult to separate the ethical from 
the aesthetic.  As the Analects 12:8 states: 
 
Kih Tsze-shing said, ‘In a superior man it is only 
the substantial qualities which are wanted;—why 
should we seek for ornamental accomplishments?’ 
Tsze-kung said, ‘Alas! Your words, sir, show you 
to be a superior man, but four horses cannot 
overtake the tongue. Ornament is as substance; 
substance is as ornament. The hide of a tiger or a 
leopard stripped of its hair is like the hide of a dog 
 
58. See generally NOONAN, supra note 39. 
59. Id. at 19. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 20. 
62. MURDOCH, supra note 55, at 30. 
63. Miller notes that both law and ritual “joins the individual in solidarity 
with the group” and “imposes on people certain conventional and obligatory 
forms of behavior.”  Miller, supra note 37, at 1181.  As part of the “essential 
constitution of human societies,” law and ritual provide a “constitutive” form 
of self-conceptualization and internalization of the communicated values 
within the ritual.  Id.  Law and ritual develop an understanding within its own 
conceptualization, or a “language in the context of looking” to use Murdoch’s 
term.  MURDOCH, supra note 55, at 30. 
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or a goat stripped of its hair.’64 
 
In the above quote, there is a substance within the 
ornamentation of rituals, an acknowledgment that the aesthetic 
contemplation of ritual practice ties moral emotions into the 
rituals themselves.  David Wong writes, “a graceful and whole-
hearted expression of respect can be beautiful precisely because 
it reflects the extent that the agent has made this moral attitude 
part of her second nature.”65  In this way, “beauty has a moral 
dimension.”66 
An aesthetic appreciation of both ceremonial rituals 
through li and legal rituals through the legal process provides 
an aesthetic appreciation of the virtues expressed in rituals.  By 
observing both rituals at a psychical distance, people can 
contemplate the meaning within the practice deriving an 
aesthetic experience of the virtues communicated in rituals and 
developing a language of understanding these communicated 
virtues through contemplation. 
III. CO-EXISTING COMPATIBILITY 
Now that we have examined the ways Confucian ideas can 
be compatible with the idea of the law, we will now look to the 
question of how Confucianism can be compatible with the law.  
We propose two different models in addressing the “how” 
question: the co-existing model and the integrating model.  The 
co-existing model sees Confucianism and the law co-existing in 
real ways within a legal system.67  While some compromise will 
be needed, a co-existing model sees both Confucianism and the 
law existing in recognizable forms within each system.  The 
integrating mode, on the other hand, sees the two traditions 
integrating into a new political and legal system.68 
We will begin with the co-existing model.  This model is, 
historically, the most recognizable.  As Luke T. Lee and Whalen 
W. Lai acknowledge, while Confucianism was not optimistic 
 
64. CONFUCIUS, supra note 32, at bk. XII. 
65. David Wong, Chinese Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta, ed. 2020). 
66.  Id. 
67. Gao & Walayat, supra note 18. 
68. Id. 
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about incorporating positive law into its philosophy, 
Confucianism co-existed with the philosophical tradition of 
Legalism throughout most of China’s history.69  Most Chinese 
dynasties since the Han dynasty (207 B.C.-220 A.D.), have 
maintained Confucianism as a guiding philosophy, while also 
utilizing extensive positive laws and punishments inspired by 
the Legalist tradition.  Given that Confucianism always 
maintained “clear and definite purposes of government,” it was 
not uncommon in China’s history to make Confucian doctrines 
“the content of the law, [with] the criminal code bec[oming] the 
instrument of executing such content.”70  Herbert H. P. Ma refers 
to this as the “Legalization of Confucianism.”71  Ma notes, 
however, that this phenomenon “brought disrespect and even 
damage to both the law and Confucianism,” as “‘[c]ompulsory’ 
morality” was unable to bring about moral development, which 
is the first priority of Confucius and Mencius.72 
Contemporarily, however, Confucians can still maintain an 
influence outside of being the concrete content of the law.  In 
some cases, given Confucianism’s influence on a country’s 
culture, Confucianism can also serve as a guiding influence in a 
court’s interpretation of laws.  The clearest example of this is 
seen in the experience of South Korea.  In a 2003 article, 
Chaihark Hahm discusses two cases in which the Constitutional 
Court of Korea faced issues related to Confucian traditions in 
Korean culture and whether they conflicted with South Korea’s 
democratic constitution.73 
The first case Hahm discusses was a 1998 case in which the 
Constitutional Court struck down a law concerning family 
rituals, a form of sumptuary law.74  Sumptuary laws were a 
common part of Confucian Korea, governing what and how much 
people could consume in family rituals, though traditionally, 
there were traditional differences based on social status and 
class.75  However, in 1993, the Korean government promulgated 
 
69. See Lee & Lai, supra note 28, at 1307. 
70. Ma, supra note 31, at 673. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 674. 
73. Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 253 (2003). 
74. Id. at 280–87. 
75. Id. at 281–82. 
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a sumptuary law regarding family rituals which “aimed at 
obliterating or minimizing any class distinctions,” limiting 
across the board “the amount people could spend on food and 
drinks at family rituals.”76  The government, recognizing the 
importance of such a ritual in Korean culture, sought to 
minimize the inequality that would naturally stem from 
differences in spending among the families.77  In 1998, the 
Constitutional Court held parts of the law unconstitutional, 
finding that the practice of serving food and drinks on special 
occasions were part of an individual’s “general freedom of 
action,” a protected constitutional right under the “right to 
pursue happiness.”78  Further, the court found the law 
unconstitutionally vague, as the “law allowed an exception for 
food and drinks that were ‘reasonable in light of the true 
meaning of family ritual and ceremony,’” a standard unclear and 
certainly unobvious.79  Hahm points out that the court’s decision 
had the effect of upholding traditional Confucian customs on the 
basis of individualistic principles and also notes that the court 
sidestepped the issue of Confucianism’s place in Korean society 
by not commenting on arguments about whether matters of 
ritual are better decided by the government or by social 
custom.80 
The second case Hahm discusses was a 1997 decision by the 
Constitutional Court which struck down an article of the family 
law section of the Korean Civil Code as unconstitutional.81  The 
section prohibited marriages between people with the same 
surname who also had the same “ancestral seat.”82  An 
“ancestral seat” is a geographical location where a given 
surname is believed to have originated from.83  In South Korea, 
many people share the same surname, but if two people sharing 
the same surname and the same ancestral seat, they were said 
to be members of the same family, and their marriage would be 
 
76. Id. at 282. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 283 (citations omitted). 
79. Id. (citations omitted). 
80. Id. at 285. 
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deemed incestuous.84  However, people of the same surname 
from the same ancestral seat could be so numerous that large 
swaths of the population with otherwise no familial ties to each 
other would not be allowed to marry.85  The Constitutional Court 
found the prohibition unconstitutional as it violated human 
dignity and the right to pursue happiness as provided for in the 
constitution.86  However, the decision was not unanimous, and 
the dissenting Justices argued that the prohibition was not 
inconsistent with another enshrined constitutional principle: 
“the duty of the state to preserve and develop traditional 
national culture.”87 
In these two decisions, we see that the court’s decisions were 
never expressly made on Confucian interpretations, but that 
Confucianism was so entrenched in Korean culture that respect 
for cultural considerations needed to be considered by the court 
in making their decisions.  The family ritual decision can be said 
to have been made without regard for Confucian interpretations, 
as the law was struck down for vagueness and for violating a 
constitutional right to pursue happiness.  The second decision, 
specifically in the conflict between the majority and dissent, took 
more seriously the issue of making decisions based on cultural 
considerations; while both sides made their decision based on 
enshrined constitutional rights, the dissent acknowledged that 
the government had a place in protecting cultural traditions, 
many of which have a strong connection with Confucianism.  
Thus, Confucianism and the law can co-exist.  It can exist 
through Confucian traditionalism guiding private lives with 
governments responsible for enshrining and protecting these 
cultural practices through the force of law. 
Another example would be succession laws in 
predominately Chinese communities.  In her investigation of the 
succession laws of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China, 
Lusina Ho determines that the laws of each entity were 
influenced by Confucianism.88  She distinguishes between what 
 
84. Id. at 288. 
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86. Id. at 293. 
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88. Lusina Ho, Traditional Confucian Values and Western Legal 
Frameworks: The Law of Succession, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD 
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she calls the “strong claim,” in which the distinctive aspects of 
the laws can only be justified by Confucianism, with the “weak 
claim,” in which such features of the succession law can be 
justified on the Confucian values within the mind of 
legislators.89  Like the Korean examples above, the “weak claim” 
can draw from Confucian interpretations of societal concerns, 
including culture.  In her observations, Ho concludes that all 
three communities—Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland 
China—have special provisions for needy heirs that were 
sometimes more “far-reaching” than Western counterparts, that 
mainland China entitled parents to the first priority of 
succession along with the decedent’s spouse and children, and 
that mainland China would grant or withhold inheritance 
regarding whether the claimant furnished maintenance to the 
decedent.90  Here, we can see examples of succession laws being 
influenced by Confucian concerns.  Ho notes that the provision 
for needy heirs may draw from the Confucian concept of “ren” (
仁) or “benevolence.”91  The provision of placing parents to the 
first priority of succession can be seen as being influenced by the 
Confucian value of xiao (孝) or “filial piety.”92  The Chinese civil 
law’s consideration of whether the heir has provided support to 
the decedent and its equitable adjustment of the claimant’s 
share, depending on the maintenance provided, may be 
influenced by the Confucian value that encourages the young to 
care for the old.93 
Ho interestingly notes that certain “forced heirship rules” 
provide that “certain rights of inheritance cannot be curtailed by 
will” and that “rules that grant provisions for the family and 
dependents of the deceased irrespective of what the will says.”94  
She acknowledges that forced heirship is not uncommon in civil 
law countries, yet it differs greatly from common law countries 
in which testamentary intent of the decedent is the “cornerstone 
of [the] will.”95  Some examples of forced heirs include the 
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95. Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. 
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decedent’s siblings and needy heirs in Chinese civil law.96  In all 
of these scenarios, Ho notes that Confucianism needs not to be 
the only basis of justifying these laws and that Western 
liberalism may also alternatively justify these rules, including 
the right of those heirs who have a “legitimate expectation” of 
succession.97  While there is an inference of Confucian influence 
on these laws, there is no direct evidence that these laws were 
based solely on Confucian grounds. 
The co-existence of Confucianism and the law goes beyond 
decision-making based on legal considerations of Confucian 
culture.  The examples described above can be interpreted as a 
weak form of Confucian influence transmitted through the 
culture of Korean and predominantly Chinese communities.  
However, there is room within co-existing compatibilism for 
Confucianism to serve as a basis for decision-making.  This 
model would develop a more concrete form of Confucian 
influence, allowing private arbitration to be decided with direct 
reference to Confucianism in decision-making rather than 
through indirect considerations for culture.98  It would be similar 
to the way religious law is used in private arbitration in family 
law cases where decisions are rendered through the use of 
Halakha (Jewish law), Sharia (Islamic law), and Canon law 
(Christian law).99  Controversies remain today, but it still 
maintains a robust jurisprudence in Western democratic 
countries.100  This model would apply Confucian decision-
making as if it was religious law, though this may be a 
misnomer.  Nevertheless, this model would provide a familiar 
form of co-existence between Confucian decision-making and a 
Western legal system. 
IV. INTEGRATING COMPATIBILISM 
Scholars like Xu Keqian have argued that Confucianism can 
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serve to ground typical democratic elements by offering 
alternate explanations for democratic institutions or to infuse 
democracy with better meaning.101  Thus, a model of integrating 
compatibilism seeks to examine how Confucianism can offer 
alternative explanations for legal systems and perhaps infuse 
legal systems with deeper meaning.  In order to examine this, it 
is worth examining differing views of the “ends” of the law.  To 
speak of the “end” of something can be taken in many ways.  In 
one sense, speaking about the “end of the world” defines “end” 
as the “termination,” at which point the world would no longer 
exist as it once did.  Alternatively, “end” can refer to an endpoint 
in a linear progression.  Finally, we come to the meaning of “end” 
that we use for this section, that of “end” or “ends” as “goals.”  In 
this sense, we are speaking of the “ends of the law” as referring 
to the goals, or what Lon Fuller calls the “substantive aims” of 
the law.102 
The Western legal tradition has struggled with the question 
of the “ends of the law,” with the specific aims differing among 
the different legal schools of thought.  Roscoe Pound, for 
example, writing from the position of sociological jurisprudence, 
argues that the law is a tool of social engineering.103  He notes 
four functions of the law over history, with the law first serving 
as a way of (1) keeping peace in society to prevent self-redress 
by a victim’s kin organization, (2) preserving the status quo, (3) 
creating an environment to allow for maximum free self-
assertion, and (4) satisfying the social wants of people.104  
Perhaps not contradictory to Pound’s identification of the 
functions of the law, H.L.A. Hart identifies “survival” as the 
central human good as the main motivational factor for legal 
development.105  
Hart’s version of legal positivism is particularly important, 
because nearly all theories finding a relationship between law 
and morality is written in response to Hart.  Lon Fuller, for 
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19
2020 CONFUCIANISM AND LAW 253 
example, identifies an internal morality of the law, commenting 
that there are eight desirable aspects of the law necessary to 
make it effective.106  To Fuller, the end of the law is to support 
an environment where individuals would be most able to 
communicate with each other by “[o]pen[ing] up, maintain[ing], 
and preserv[ing] the integrity of the channels of communication 
by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, or 
desire.”107 
Natural law theorists take a more moral view on the 
substantive ends of the law.  John Finnis, for example, argues 
that the law should serve to protect the basic human goods, and 
while every moral decision cannot exercise every human good for 
every human being, laws must be structured in a way that they 
do not actively act against a basic human good.108  Finnis 
identifies seven basic human goods, but notes that this list is 
non-exhaustive, consisting of life, knowledge, play, aesthetic 
experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion.109 
Legal deontologists see the end of the law as the implementation 
of a system of moral rules or principles, such as the avoidance of 
moral wrongs and the protection of moral rights.  One example 
might be Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, which 
seeks the “coherence of the fundamental moral principles that 
justify the relevant moral, political and legal past decisions in a 
given domain.”110 
More recently, there has been a growing scholarship within 
what can be called a “virtue jurisprudence” or the “aretaic theory 
of law.”111  This school of jurisprudence drawing from the virtue 
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ethics tradition in moral philosophy sees the promotion of 
“human flourishing” as the aim of the law.112  Human flourishing 
is defined as a life of “rational and social activities that express 
the human excellences or virtues.”113  One advocate of this 
approach is Lawrence Solum, who describes a theory of law that 
sees legislation as a way to promote virtue.114  Solum argues that 
legislation “should aim at the promotion of human flourishing” 
by “creating vibrant communities with opportunities for 
meaningful work and play that engage our rational capacities,” 
while also “creating the conditions for healthy emotional and 
intellectual development.”115  Thus, for Solum: 
 
The core idea [of Justice as Lawfulness] is that 
justice is a disposition to be lawful, but in a special 
sense that departs from the idea that lawfulness 
reduces to a disposition to obey the positive law.  
This departure is illuminated by substituting a 
stipulated concept of a nomos for the notion of 
positive law.  Let us use the term nomoi in this 
stipulated sense to refer to the deeply held and 
widely shared social norms of a community with 
human flourishing.  The positive laws of a given 
community can play a role similar to the nomoi to 
the extent that they are promulgated by 
institutions or persons whose authority is 
recognised by the relevant social norms and so 
long as the content of the positive laws is 
consistent with substantive content of the system 
of nomoi.  Many positive laws correspond directly 
to widely shared and deeply held social norms: 
laws prohibiting murder and theft are like this.116 
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Solum notes, however, that positive laws could directly 
conflict with the nomoi, though conflicts are not necessarily fatal 
and positive laws could co-exist with contradictory nomoi.117  
Solum’s theory of law focuses on the promotion of nomoi, or the 
development of communities that “encourage the internalisation 
of the widely shared and deeply held social norms that are 
consistent with human flourishing.”118  Solum’s aretaic theory of 
law, drawing from virtue ethics, while Aristotelian in its 
influence, is compatible with Confucian ethics, at least 
Confucian ethics interpreted as a form of virtue ethics.  Solum 
and Linghao Wang later developed a theory of “virtue 
jurisprudence” influenced by Confucianism.119  Solum and 
Wang’s virtue jurisprudence is an example of integrating 
compatibilism, as their project seeks to reconcile individual 
freedom with a social order developed by the Confucian notion 
of harmony.120  Drawing from li, they identify “harmony of 
society and harmony of the individual” as the central end of the 
law within their theory.121  Li plays both a social coordinative 
function by directing the harmony of society and ordering 
everyone into their proper positions in the community while  at 
the same time developing voluntary compliance by individuals 
with the law, which is related to li’s expressive function.122  To 
Solum and Wang, “[i]ndividuals can express their emotions or 
exercise their virtues smoothly with the help of Li and follow 
their own sentiments and desires without creating a breach of 
Li.”123  With enough “external proper social circumstances and 
the natural development of affective capacity without 
disruption, humans can experience an inner harmony between 
their emotional state[s] and the requirements of virtue.”124 
They note, however, that because li and the law do not share 
common functions of expression and disposition, the law’s ability 
to “foster autonomous harmony” is limited as it is unable to play 
the same pervasive role in shaping values and virtues the same 
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way that li can.125  The correct use of names, therefore, would 
help to identify certain legal principles within reality and help 
citizens to internalize these legal norms and build a motivation 
to obey the law.126  The proper use of names, therefore, has an 
important part in the communicative aspects of the law.  By 
focusing on the proper definitions of names and concepts within 
the law, a Confucian virtue jurisprudence would seek to ensure 
that the legal definitions of legal concepts correspond with 
reality.  Ensuring that the names of concepts within the law 
correspond with reality would encourage people to internalize 
the proper behaviors communicated within the law into 
behaviors in reality.  This would encourage people to understand 
the definitions of the relationships within li when participating 
in the legal process.  A Confucian theory of law would seek to 
define these narratives and the relationships they represent.  
While it may not be committed to enshrining principles of li 
within positive law, it would ensure that these inherent 
relationships are defined within the context of the values of li.  
Further, given Confucius’s emphasis on the proper use of names, 
a Confucian virtue jurisprudence would need to go beyond 
merely enforcing li through the law.  It should instead focus on 
identifying consistent names between concepts in the law and in 
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supra note 32, at bk. XIII.  From this passage, Confucius notes the importance 
of having names in proper accord with reality in order to build an 
understandable moral language.  Likewise, a Confucian theory of law would 
focus on ensuring that the legal definitions of things are correctly in accord 
with reality in order for people to properly internalize the definitions 
communicated in the law. 
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reality, communicating their applicability both within and 
outside of the legal process. 
An integrating compatibilism model seeks to infuse 
concepts with additional, and perhaps fuller meaning, both in 
identifying an “end” of the law as well as providing additional 
meaning to the narratives inherent within the law.  Wang and 
Solum have provided one of the strongest attempts to identify a 
new system which acknowledges Confucianism and the law.  The 
integrating model takes a step further than previous Chinese 
dynasties’ attempts to enforce Confucianism by the law.  
Instead, this model does not simply seek to enforce li, but to 
construct systems which apply li into legal systems, providing 
the law with deeper ritual meaning.  By doing this, the law 
would be a way to communicate virtue and right actions through 
the observation of right behaviors within the legal relationships 
protected in legal systems.  Such a model may provide a 
foundation for a landscape that is fertile for moral cultivation 
and the attainment of moral virtues. 
The most important thing integrating compatibilism 
provides is an examination of the meaning of the law.  To say 
that Confucianism can inflect the law with deeper meaning 
requires observers to ask what the meaning of the law is, or more 
properly, what are the ends and purposes of the law.  A 
Confucian virtue jurisprudence, as well as virtue jurisprudence 
among other virtue ethics traditions like Neo-Aristotelianism or 
Stoicism, sees virtue as the end of the law, with the law not 
simply enforcing “virtuous” behaviors, but by creating an 
environment in which a human being can pursue virtues and, by 
pursuing such virtue, flourish.  Wang and Solum identify 
“harmony” as the state of affairs in which human beings are 
most able to pursue virtues.127  However, the law is not simply 
relegated to providing a system in which material needs are 
filled, but must be incorporated within the pursuit of virtues 
themselves.  The law in an integrating model serves as a way for 
individuals to participate in pursuing virtues within the legal 
process. 
The integration of Confucianism and the law leads to the 
creation of a new system in which these two elements are 
identifiable but also incorporated.  It does not only see the law 
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as enforcing Confucian rituals, as was discussed in the examples 
of co-existing models, but also seeks to utilize the law to pursue 
Confucian ends: a harmonious society and the pursuit of virtues.  
It does this by providing legal identification of the relationships 
within human society in order to assist in internalizing these 
relationships as well as developing legal rituals in which people 
would be able to practice li. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To say two traditions are “compatible” requires an 
examination of “what” is compatible and “how” they are 
compatible.  We hope that we have taken the first few steps into 
examining the different ways that Confucianism is compatible 
with the law.  In discussing the “what” question, we can see how 
different abstract concepts such as rituals play an important role 
in both Confucianism and in systems of the law.  Also, in 
examining the “how” question, we can also see ways in which 
Confucianism and the law can exist within one system in a 
meaningful way.  While many Chinese dynasties have 
attempted to combine both Confucian philosophy and 
complicated legal systems within their political culture, a 
compatible view goes beyond merely the “legalization of 
Confucianism.”  Instead, it is a “Confucianization of the law,” 
seeking to expand the nature and functions of the law as a way 
to promote virtues rather than simply a pragmatic tool of 
coercion. 
While a Confucian view of the law would certainly see the 
law as an opportunity for social engineering, the engineering 
would not come from coercion, but from providing the law with 
ritual significance which participants in the legal system would, 
hopefully, internalize.  Confucianism does not need to be 
abandoned to modernity, for it provides indigenous alternatives 
that are compatible with systems of law.  More than simply an 
example of a backward rule-of-men understanding of Chinese 
law, Confucianism offers the possibility of a Chinese law that 
looks beyond mere commands of the sovereign, touching upon 
the “soul” of the Chinese legal subject. 
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